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PER REFERENCE (A) Q'S AND A'S FOR DPC STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

U.S. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

INTRODUCTION:

THE PURPOSE OF BRIEFING ALLIES IS TWOFOLD. FIRST, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MAJOR CONCEPTS IN NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND THAT POSSIBLE MISINTERPRETATIONS ARE CORRECTED BEFORE THEY SPREAD. SECOND, TO CONVINCE THE ALLIES OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WITH THEM ON MATTERS THAT AFFECT THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS IMPORTANTLY. TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES U.S. REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH ALLIES. HOWEVER, THIS IS A SENSITIVE AND COMPLEX SUBJECT. THUS, SOME LIMITS NEED TO BE PLACED ON THE DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO PROTECT MATTERS OF PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IS TO IDENTIFY LIKELY QUESTIONS AND PLACE BOUNDARIES ON THE ANSWERS.

OUR INITIAL CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO DESCRIBE THE MAJOR POLICY CONCEPTS. THEY SHOULD AVOID GETTING INTO DETAILS OF THE OPTIONS, TARGETING AND OF ACQUISITION POLICY. DETAILED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON THE LATTER SUBJECTS SHOULD BE DEFERRED EITHER INDEFINITELY OR FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S MEETINGS WITH THE NPG AND DPC.

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A. GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. WOULD NOT THIS NEW POLICY LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD BY PLACING GREATER RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO STOP AGGRESSION?

ANSWER IT IS NOT THE INTENT OF U.S. POLICY TO LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD OR INCREASE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR MAIN AIM IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY ADDING TO THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATER. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED IN RECENT YEARS, THAT NATO MUST HAVE A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL OPTION. THE INTENT OF THE NEW POLICY IS TO MAKE THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT OF THE DETERRENT MORE EFFECTIVE, BUT IN NO SENSE CAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE CONSIDERED AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

2. DOES THE POLICY PROVIDE FOR FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RESPONSE TO NON-NUCLEAR AGGRESSION?

ANSWER: NATO HAS LONG MAINTAINED AN OPTION FOR THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RESPONSE TO NON-NUCLEAR AGGRESSION. THIS IS INHERENT IN THE CONCEPT OF DELIBERATE ESCALATION WHICH IS AN ELEMENT OF THE MC 14/3 STRATEGY. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NEVER FELT THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR NATO OR THE U.S. TO BE IN A POSITION WHERE WE WERE FORCED TO THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES WERE INADEQUATE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS VIRTUE IN MAINTAINING SOME AMBIGUITY AS TO THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE UTILIZED. IT IS NOT OUR INTENT THAT THE NEW CONCEPTS SHOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF FIRST USE NOR IS IT OUR INTENT TO ELIMINATE FIRST USE ENTIRELY AS A POSSIBLE OPTION. THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY REMAINS THE DETERRENCE OF ANY ARMED CONFLICT.

3. COULD OUR CONFESSED DESIRE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT BE VIEWED BY THE SOVIETS AS A WEAKENING OF U.S. WILL AND THEREBY RESULT IN A WEAKENING OF DETERRENCE?

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ANSWER: WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS MATTER AT GREAT LENGTH IN THE COURSE OF OUR STUDIES. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MISUNDERSTANDING. HOWEVER, WE INTEND TO MAKE CLEAR IN OUR STATEMENTS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW CONCEPTS IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE. WE BELIEVE THAT AS THE NEW CONCEPTS ARE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THEY WILL HAVE THIS EFFECT. HOWEVER, THIS NEEDS TO BE PUT VERY CAREFULLY. WE DO NOT WANT THE SOVIETS TO SEE ANY CHANGES IN OUR NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AS WEAKENING DETERRENCE, BUT NEITHER DO WE WANT THEM TO SEE IT AS A MORE AGGRESSIVE OR THREATENING POSTURE. WE HAVE THESE CONFLICTING CONSIDERATIONS FULLY IN MIND.

4. WOULD THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION BE LIMITED TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR COULD IT ALSO INCLUDE STRATEGIC WEAPONS BASED IN THE CONTINENTAL U.S.?

ANSWER: THE AIM OF THE NEW POLICY IS TO HAVE A RANGE OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE. SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL INITIAL USE MIGHT BE AT ANY LEVEL FROM THE USE OF SELECTED THEATER-BASED WEAPONS TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE BELIEVE THAT IT SERVES DETERRENCE TO RETAIN SOME AMBIGUITY AS TO PRECISELY WHAT WE WOULD DO IN A GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCE.

5. DOES THE NEW POLICY ENVISAGE LIMITED STRATEGIC STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION? IF SO, HOW WOULD WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO SUCH ATTACKS? WOULD THEY STRIKE TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE BE HIT? WOULD THEY STRIKE TARGETS IN THE U.S.?

ANSWER: WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF TARGETING HERE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT IF THE U.S. EMPLOYED STRATEGIC FORCES IN LIMITED STRIKES THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RESPOND BY STRIKING TARGETS IN EUROPE RATHER THAN TARGETS IN THE U.S.

6. DOES THE SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGY DEPEND ON PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO ADOPT SUCH A POLICY?

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ANSWER: WE DO NOT NECESSARILY NEED TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION FORMALLY TO ADOPT A SIMILAR POLICY NOR WILL WE NECESSARILY ATTEMPT TO DO SO. GIVEN THE FACT THAT OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE, WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED OUR GOAL IF THE SOVIET UNION IS DETERRED WHETHER OR NOT THEY CHANGE THEIR NUCLEAR STRATEGY. HOWEVER, IF DETERRENCE FAILS AND ESCALATION IS TO BE CONTROLLED, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR FORCES. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION PERCEIVES THAT THE U.S. HAS A RANGE OF OPTIONS THEY WOULD WANT TO DEVELOP A RANGE OF OPTIONS THEMSELVES SO AS NOT TO BE IN THE VERY POSITION THAT WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID, THAT IS A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY HAD ONLY THE CHOICE BETWEEN A MASSIVE RESPONSE OR DOING NOTHING.

7. HOW WOULD THE U.S. RESPOND IF THE SOVIETS OFFERED TO WITHHOLD AN ATTACK AGAINST THE U.S. HOMELAND IN RETURN FOR U.S. WITHHOLDING OF AN ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION?

ANSWER: WE ARE REALLY NOT IN A POSITION TO ANSWER SPECIFICALLY SUCH A GENERAL AND HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. OUR RESPONSE WOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR NATO ALLIES WE WOULD RESPOND IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD BEST PROTECT THE SECURITY INTEREST OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

8. DOES THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE PERMIT THEM TO ENGAGE IN A LIMITED ESCALATION OF THE TYPE ENVISAGED BY THE U.S. POLICY? IF IT DOES NOT, HOW WOULD THEY RESPOND? WOULD WE BE LIMITING DAMAGE TO THEM WHILE THEY WERE INFLECTING IT ON US?

ANSWER: WE ARE NOT CERTAIN AS TO THE YIELDS OF WEAPONS IN THE SOVIET STOCKPILE. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT

THEIR CURRENT WEAPONS ARE IDEALLY SUITED TO LIMITING COLLATERAL DAMAGE. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN NATO'S INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT DOCTRINES AND DEVELOP WEAPONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE LIMITATION OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THEY WILL. NOR CAN WE BE SURE THEY WILL NOT.

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9. WHAT IS CURRENT SOVIET DOCTRINE WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER? IS IT ONE CALLING FOR RESTRAINT OR IS IT ONE CALLING FOR MASSIVE RESPONSE ONCE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD HAS BEEN BREACHED?

ANSWER: WE ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN ABOUT SOVIET DOCTRINE. PAST STUDIES SUGGEST THAT IT DOES NOT CALL FOR RESTRAINT.

MAY BE THAT THEY WILL NOT CHANGE THEIR DOCTRINE, BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL IN RESPONSE TO U.S. DOCTRINE. THIS HAS HAPPENED AT TIMES IN THE PAST. IF THEY DO NOT CHANGE WE ARE STILL NO WORSE OFF THAN WE ARE AT PRESENT, AND IF THEY DO THE PROSPECTS FOR LIMITING ESCALATION COULD BE IMPROVED.

10. SHOULD THE SOVIETS ADOPT SUCH A POLICY MIGHT NOT THEY PERCEIVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IN LIMITED NUCLEAR EXCHANGES? WOULD NOT SUCH A POLICY REDUCE THEIR RISKS IN INITIATING AGGRESSION?

ANSWER: WE THINK IT VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE LIGHTLY THE RISKS OF A NUCLEAR WAR UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. CERTAINLY WE DO NOT OURSELVES. IN DEVELOPING OUR DOCTRINE WE HAVE HAD TO WEIGH THE RISKS THAT IT MIGHT REDUCE DETERRENCE AGAINST THE BENEFITS OF ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL ESCALATION IF DETERRENCE FAILED. ON BALANCE WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE NEW DOCTRINE STRENGTHENS DETERRENCE ACROSS THE BOARD AND HAS SOME PROSPECTS OF MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES IF DETERRENCE FAILS.

11. HOW EFFECTIVE WILL "SIGNALS" BE IN THE MIDST OF A CONFLICT? HOW WOULD CONSULTATIONS AMONG ALLIES BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE, SAY, INITIATING LIMITED STRATEGIC STRIKES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION?

ANSWER: ADMITTEDLY ANY SIGNAL WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONVEY IN THE MIDST OF A CONFLICT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT RELY SOLELY ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO CONVEY OUR

MESSAGE. WE DO NOT ENVISION ANY CHANGE IN CONSULTATION

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PROCEDURES IN THE ALLIANCE. THE NPG HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF CONSULTATION IN A NUCLEAR CRISIS AND THE LIMITED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND HAS DEVELOPED GUIDELINES WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE APPROPRIATE TO THE LIMITED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CONSULTATION PROCEDURES WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN THE NPG.

12. DOES THE NEW POLICY MEAN THAT WE ARE PLACING A GREATER EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT? IN OTHER CONTEXTS?

ANSWER: THE U.S. IS MOST EMPHATICALLY NOT PLACING GREATER EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE OR ELSEWHERE. OUR RECENT EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE ALLIANCE OF THE NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL POSTURE SHOULD MAKE THIS PERFECTLY CLEAR.

13. HOW WILL THE NEW POLICY AFFECT NATO DOCTRINE? TARGET PLANS? UNDER THIS POLICY, WHAT DEGREE OF CONTROL CAN AN ALLY EXERCISE OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT IN OR FROM HIS TERRITORY? CAN HE VETO THEIR USE?

ANSWER: WE DO NOT ENVISION THAT THE CHANGES WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY WILL AFFECT NATO DOCTRINE OR EXISTING COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES. THERE MAY BE SOME CHANGES IN TARGETING IN THE FUTURE BUT WE ARE STILL WORKING ON THIS. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES FURTHER IN THE NPG AFTER OUR OWN STUDIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

B. STABILITY

1. WOULD NOT AGGRESSION BE DETERRED BETTER BY A MORE AMBIGUOUS EMPLOYMENT POLICY WHICH LEFT THE SOVIETS UNCERTAIN AS TO US/NATO RESPONSES INSTEAD OF A POLICY DESIGNED TO LIMIT NUCLEAR EXCHANGES?

ANSWER: WE BELIEVE AMBIGUITY IS INCREASED BY HAVING A BROADER RANGE OF OPTIONS TO IMPLEMENT MC 4/3 WHICH IN ITSELF FOCUSES ON THE NEED TO REMAIN AMBIGUOUS ON OUR SECRET

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POSSIBLE RESPONSES.

C. ACQUISITION POLICY

1. IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF "MINI-NUKES" LINKED TO THIS NEW POLICY? IF SO, WHAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO

THE USE OF "MINI-NUKES" SINCE THEY PRESUMABLY LACK COMPARABLE TACTICAL SYSTEMS?

ANSWER: DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT A DIRECT OUTGROWTH OF MODIFICATIONS IN TARGETING. HOWEVER, IT COULD HELP TO MAKE THESE CONCEPTS MORE EFFECTIVE. WE CANNOT BE SURE WHAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD BE, BUT OUR HOPE IS THAT DETERRENCE WILL BE STRENGTHENED.

2. COULD THE POLICY REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- PARTICULARLY WITH THE ADVENT OF "MINI-NUKES"?

ANSWER: WE DO NOT BELIEVE ANY INCREASE IN THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS POLICY .

3. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE NEW POLICY WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASED DEMAND FOR US NUCLEAR FORCES.

ANSWER: WE DO NOT THINK SO. HOWEVER, ACQUISITION POLICY IS BEING STUDIED FURTHER.

4. DOES THE POLICY REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT OF YIELD/ ACCURACY COMBINATIONS NECESSARY TO ATTACK HAENED TARGETS, I.E., MISSILE SILOS?

ANSWER: NO

5. HOW CAN YOU CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT IN DEVELOPING HARD-TARGET COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES (I.E., IMPROVED ACCURACY AND YIELD), COUPLED WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF MIRVS, THAT THE U.S. IS NOT SEEKING A "FIRST-STRIKE" POSTURE?

ANSWER: IT SEEMS TO US OBVIOUS THAT A FIRST-STRIKE
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CAPABILITY IS NOT FEASIBLE FOR EITHER SIDE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THIS IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AS SECDEF HAS ALREADY DONE.

D. ARMS CONTROL

1. WHAT AFFECT WILL THE NEW POLICY HAVE ON VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?

A. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. WILL NEW TACTICAL WEAPONS (E.G., "MINI-NUKES") AND NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS (E.G., COUNTERFORCE WEAPONS) REQUIRE CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING?

ANSWER: THIS WILL DEPEND ON THE WEAPONS WE EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO DEVELOP. THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN IS ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IF THIS CAN BE RESOLVED WE DO NOT BELIEVE OUR WEAPONS

DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS WILL PROVE TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO FURTHER PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL.

B. SALT. WHAT STRATEGIC WEAPONS OPTIONS CANNOT BE FORECLOSED IN SALT IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THIS NEW POLICY?

ANSWER: SALT DEALS PRIMARILY WITH THE SIZE OF STRATEGIC FORCES. WE SEE NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TARGETING OPTIONS AND SALT. THE POLICY SHOULD NOT COMPLICATE SALT AS IT CAN BE ADAPTED TO ANY EQUITABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

C. MBFR. WHAT EFFECT WILL THIS POLICY HAVE ON THE PROPOSED U.S. NUCLEAR OPTION (III) OR FOR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF NUKES IN MBFR?

ANSWER: WE DO NOT SEE ANY SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIP TO MBFR. WE CONSIDER THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR OPTION TO REMAIN VALID.

E. FOR ALLIES

1. HOW SPECIFICALLY DOES THE NEW POLICY ENHANCE NATO SECRET

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SECURITY? WOULD NOT THE POLICY OF CONTROLLED ESCALATION, IF IT WORKED, VISIT NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHEREAS NUCLEAR EXCHANGES ON U.S. OR SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?

ANSWER: BY HAVING A BROADER RANGE OF OPTIONS WE ENHANCE DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF AGGRESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE. WE HAVE NO INTENTION, NOR DO WE BELIEVE IT REALISTIC TO FIGHT A PROLONGED NUCLEAR WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE. ESCALATION CONTROL INVOLVES SELECTED LIMITED OPTIONS WITH SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS IN NO WAY THE INTENT OF THESE OPTIONS TO MAKE THE US AND USSR SANCTUARIES FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. COULD NOT FRENCH OR BRITISH ESCALATION TO A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE FRUSTRATE THE CONTROL ESCALATION CONCEPT?

ANSWER: THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT IT ALSO HAS BEEN POSSIBLE IN THE PAST. WE DO NOT THINK OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH FRIENDS WILL WISH TO EMPLOY THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES UNTIL OTHER OPTIONS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. AS TO THEIR PLANS, YOU SHOULD ADDRESS ANY QUESTIONS TO THEM.

3. HOW CAN COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ASSURE THAT DECISIONS TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS SELECTIVELY AND IN A CONTROLLED LIMITED MANNER WILL IN FACT BE CARRIED OUT? DOES THIS POLICY IMPLY DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY IN

ADVANCE TO U.S. THEATER COMMANDERS? HOW CAN ALLIES ENTER INTO THIS PROCESS ADEQUATELY, WHEN THE WEAPONS INVOLVED MAY BE EMPLACED ON THEIR TERRITORY, OPERATE FROM IT, OR IMPACT ON IT?

ANSWER: WE DO NOT NOW ENVISION THIS POLICY RESULTING IN CHANGES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES IN NATO. THESE PROCEDURES CAREFULLY WORKED OUT OVER MANY YEARS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUFFICE. WE ARE HOWEVER CURRENTLY REVIEWING THE PLANNING PROCEDURE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE PRESIDENT WITH APPROPRIATE STAFF SUPPORT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR USE OF A BROADER RANGE OF OPTIONS. THE U.S. HAS LONG BEEN OPPOSED TO PREDELEGATION AND WE CONTINUE TO BE. THIS IS REALLY AS MUCH AS WE CAN SAY ON
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THIS MATTER TODAY. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS FURTHER IN THE APPROPRIATE NATO BODIES AT A LATER DATE. KISSINGER

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